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JOINDER OF CONTROLLING NON-PARTIES: ELIMINATING
HIDE-AND-SEEK IN PATENT LITIGATION*
IF A sues B, and C assumes control of the action on behalf of one of the
parties, to what extent will the ensuing judgment be determinative of the
rights of C? The statements of courts and commentators suggest the follow-
ing general rule: one who controls an action will be bound by the adjudicated
issues to the same extent as a party of record.' This means that in a subse-
quent suit between the controlling non-party 2 and his adversary in the prior
action, an estoppel is raised as to those issues.3 In order for this rule to be in-
voked, the non-party must have the right to introduce evidence, examine wit-
*Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260 (1961).
1. Souffront v. Compagnie des Sucreries, 217 U.S. 475 (1910) ; Ark-Tenn Distribut-
ing Corp. v. Breidt, 209 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1954) ; Beyer Co. v. Fleischmann Co., 15 F.2d
465 (6th Cir. 1926); Penfield v. C. & A. Potts & Co., 126 Fed. 475 (6th Cir. 1903);
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 84 (1942) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT] ; FREEMAN,
JUDGMENTS § 432 (5th ed. 1925). See generally, 139 A.L.R. 1 (1942).
2. For lack of a better term, the one who controls a lawsuit will be referred to as the
"controlling non-party," or simply "non-party," denoting a corporation as well as an in-
dividual.
3. Courts have attempted to describe this estoppel effect both in terms of res judicata,
Tootle v. Coleman, 107 Fed. 41 (8th Cir. 1901) ; David Bradley Mfg. Co. v. Eagle Mfg.
Co., 57 Fed. 980 (7th Cir. 1893) ; Clair v. Kastar, 51 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), and
collateral estoppel, Empire State Nail Co. v. American Solid Leather Button Co., 71 Fed.
588 (C.C.D.R.I. 1896), 3 WALKER, PATENTS § 684 (Deller ed. 1937). Res judicata
presumes that the parties are concluded "not only as to every matter which was offered
and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible
matter which might have been offered for that purpose." Cromwell v. County of Sac,
94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876). Use of the term is compatible with the non-party's right to inter-
pose defenses in the subsequent suit to the extent that such defenses are personal and thus
could not be raised while he participated in the name of another. See note 69 infra and
accompanying text. On the other hand, the subsequent suit, despite the fact that it poses
issues similar to those litigated in the original action, clearly seems to present a different
cause of action, Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. National Elec. Prods. Corp., 125 F.2d
1008, 1009 (3d Cir. 1942), Australian Knitting Co. v. Gormly, 138 Fed. 92 (C.C.N.D.N.Y.
1905), Note, 57 HARv. L. REv. 574, 575 (1944), a situation to which the doctrine of col-
lateral estoppel is more appropriate, Cromwell v. County of Sac, supra at 354. See gen-
erally, Scott, Collateral Estoppel By .Tudgment, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1, (1942). This pre-
cludes in the second suit all those issues actually litigated in the first, but, as opposed to
the application of res judicata discussed above, does not preclude those issues which could
have been, but were not, raised in the first suit. Id. at 5-7; RESTATEMENT § 68, comments d
and e. The justification for this departure from principles of res judicata was expressed
in Watts v. Watts, 160 Mass. 464, 465, 36 N.E. 479 (1894) :
It would be a harsh and oppressive rule which should make it necessary for one
sued on a trifling claim to resist it, and engage in costly litigation in order to pre-
vent the operation of a judgment which would be held conclusively to have estab-
lished against him every material fact alleged and not denied in the declaration,
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nesses, and prosecute an appeal,4 that is, substantially all the rights of a named
party. But only one whose control is motivated by a proprietary or financial in-
terest in the outcome of the litigation will fall within the rule.6 Though, tradition-
ally, control has had to be open and avowed in order for the controlling person or
the adverse party to be bound, 7 more recent opinions have held the former to
be bound where his participation, concealed during the litigation, is subse-
quently discovered. 8 The practice of binding a controlling non-party, although
he does not appear on the record, finds justification in the fundamental legal
principle that one who has a substantial interest in a subject, and has had an
opportunity to direct an action contesting that subject, has been given his day
in court as to the issues actually litigated.9 The effect of such binding is to
so as to preclude him from showing the truth if another controversy should arise
between the same parties.
Because the expenses of litigation may deter the manufacturer from devoting his fullest
energies to the defense of a suit against a remote distributor, the application of collateral
estoppel instead of res judicata seems warranted.
4. Lovejoy v. Murray, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 1, 18-19 (1865) (dictum); Note, 65 HARv.
L. REv. 818, 856 (1952). But see Leahy v. Mercantile Trust Co., 296 Mo. 561, 247 S.W.
396 (1922) (non-party bound though denied right to appeal because not a party of
record).
5. See FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 433 (5th ed. 1925). But members of a group spon-
soring litigation can be bound though all had to submit to the will of the majority and,
therefore, no single member had complete control of the defense. Universal Oil Prods.
Co. v. Winkler-Koch Eng'r Co., 27 F. Supp. 161 (N.D. Ill. 1939); Greenwich Ins. Co. v.
N. & M. Friedman Co., 142 Fed. 944 (6th Cir. 1905). Aware of such decisions, a patent
lawyer advises that, when such pooling arrangements are undertaken,
each contributor should be careful to retain no control over the expenditure of the
fund and the conduct of the suit, lest he be legally bound by an adverse outcome.
However, on finding one of their number about to win, it may be desirable to
come immediately into the open and get it into the record . . . . HoAR, PATENT
TACTICS AND LAW 232 (3d ed. 1950).
6. RESTATEMENT § 84. Comment, 65 HARv. L. REv. 818, 856 (1952). Describing
this same requirement, some courts have spoken in terms of control being undertaken
to protect some right or interest of his own. Souffront v. Compagnie des Sucreries, 217
U.S. 475, 487 (1910) ; Dow Chem. Co. v. Metlon Corp., 281 F.2d 292, 297 (4th Cir. 1960).
Interest in the decision as a judicial precedent is not sufficient, Bigelow v. Old Dominion
Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912), nor is mere contribution to the de-
fense costs, Rumford Chem. Works v. Hygienic Chem. Co., 215 U.S. 156 (1909).
7. Souffront v. Compagnie des Sucreries, 217 U.S. 475 (1910) ; Lane v. Welds, 99 Fed.
286 (6th Cir. 1899) ; 2 BLACX, JUDGMENTS § 540 (1891). Only a rigid adherence to the
doctrine of mutuality of estoppel barred the adverse party from offering proof of his op-
ponent's unsuccessfully concealed control. Note, 39 COLuTm. L. REv. 1251, 1252-53 & n.13
(citation of cases) (1939).
8. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co., 120 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1941);
E.W. Bliss Co. v. Cold Metal Process Co., 1 F.R.D. 193 (N.D. Ohio 1940); Universal
Oil Prods. Co. v. Winkler-Koch Eng'r Co., 27 F. Supp. 161 (N.D. Ill. 1939).
9. Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Doiron, 170 F.2d 206, 209 (1st Cir. 1948) ; RESTATEMENT
§ 84, comment a; United States v. Dollar, 100 F. Supp. 881, 886 (N.D. Cal. 1951), rev'd
on other grounds, 196 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1952).
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avoid repetitious litigation and to require judicial recognition of those who de-
termined the course of the action.
Most instances of non-party control arise where a stranger to an action has
a duty of indemnification toward one of the parties and will, therefore, ulti-
mately carry the burden of a judgment adverse to his indemnitee.10 The pro-
totype is the liability insurance contract, where the insurer assumes control of
an action by a third party against the insured.'1 Nevertheless, the important
problems of control do not often arise in this area. The consequences of control
are only significant because of their effect on a subsequent action between the
controlling person and the adverse party.12 But in the typical suit under a
liability insurance policy, no separate claim exists against the insurer; if the
judgment against the insured is satisfied, the question of his control will, there-
fore, not be raised.'
8
Control is of greatest significance in the area of patent litigation. Typically,
a patentee brings an action against a vendor, accused of selling a product which
infringes the plaintiff's patent, and the manufacturer of the product, usually
bound by contract to save his customer harmless from an infringement Suit,
14
10. See, e.g., Hauke v. Cooper, 108 Fed. 922 (5th Cir. 1901) (warrantor of title to land
defended suit against warrantee); Tootle v. Coleman, 107 Fed. 41 (8th Cir. 1901)
(creditor defended sheriff who, given creditor's assurance of protection, attached land
later claimed by plaintiff) ; Marshall Metal Prods., Inc. v. Aghnides, 126 F. Supp. 850
(S.D.N.Y. 1954) (manufacturer contractually bound to defend his distributor in infringe-
ment action) ; RESTATEMENT § 84, illustration 7 (action against surety defended by prin-
cipal). But the proprietary or financial interest requisite to a finding of control and
an application of estoppel need not derive from a contractual obligation of indemnity.
G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 241 U.S. 22 (1916) (publisher who received royalties
on sale of dictionaries defended distributor in copyright suit); Overman Cushion Tire
Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 48 F.2d 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1930) (suit against sub-
sidiary defended by parent company).
11. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Coughran, 303 U.S. 485 (1938);
Shelby Mut. Cas. Co. v. Richmond, 185 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1950).
12. Though a finding of control may significantly affect the outcome of a suit be-
tween the controlling non-party and the named party receiving the benefit of such con-
trol, such actions are less frequent and without the scope of this discussion. For citation
of cases, see 139 A.L.R. 1, 10 (1942).
13. Under commonly accepted tort principles, a satisfied judgment bars any further
recovery on the same claim.
But if the insurance company has undertaken to control the insured's defense, and an
adverse judgment remains unsatisfied, some cases have allowed the injured party to hold
the insurer directly liable in a subsequent garnishment proceeding on the basis of the
company's control of the litigation. See, e.g., Patterson v. Adan, 119 Minn. 308, 138
N.W. 281 (1912). See VANCE, INSURANCE § 135, at 803 & n.18 (3d ed. 1951) (citing
cases). In these cases, proof of control would clearly be an element essential to re-
covery.
14. See Note, 72 H.Av. L. REv. 328, 332 (1958). See generally, POOLE, Patent Protec-




assumes control of the action.' 5 The patentee, upon resolution of this action,
still retains a separate cause of action against the manufacturer, even though
infringement is charged against the same product. 16 If this second action is
pursued, its outcome may be significantly affected by a finding that control ex-
isted in the first suit.Y7
Practical considerations peculiar to patent litigation help to explain the fre-
quency with which the issue of control arises in the patent field. In perhaps
no other field is there such a clearly defined and widely recognized disparity in
the attitudes and holdings of the different circuits,' 8 and in no other field is
the resulting temptation to forum-shop so easily gratified. Given these cir-
cumstances, and the fact that an infringement suit will usually be prosecuted
most profitably and most effectively against the manufacturer of the infringing
article, the patentee will often succeed in accomplishing by indirection that
which he might otherwise fail to accomplish by a suit directly against the manu-
facturer. Thus, if the manufacturer is amenable to suit only in a jurisdiction
regarded as hostile to patents, the patentee, aware that the manufacturer will
probably assume control of an infringement action against a distributor, need
only seek a friendlier jurisdiction in which the product is sold and there insti-
tute suit against a user or distributor. 9 If the patentee receives a favorable
decree, he is free to bring suit in the manufacturer's district and, if he can
prove control,20 to preclude the manufacturer from reopening those issues ad-
15. See, e.g., S.S. Kresge Co. v. Winget Kickernick Co., 96 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1938) ;
Warford Corp. v. Bryan Screw Mach. Prods. Co., 44 F.2d 713 (6th Cir. 1930) ; Brock v.
Brown, 130 F. Supp. 628 (D. Md. 1956).
16. "[Tlhe cause of action of a patent owner against an infringing manufacturer is
wholly separate and distinct from his cause of action against one who resells the infring-
ing product." Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. National Elec. Prods. Corp., 125 F.2d
1008, 1009 (3d Cir. 1942).
17. If it is found that the manufacturer controlled the first suit, he and the patentee
will be estopped, by principles of collateral estoppel, see note 3 supra, from relitigating
any of the matters argued in that suit.
18. See Lang & Thomas, Disposition of Patent Cases by Courts During the Period
1939 to 1949, 32 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 803 (1950), which compares the percentage of
patents invalidated in each circuit. The article points out, for example, that between
1945 and 1949, patentees lost 94% of their suits in the Eighth Circuit and only 23%
in the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 807.
19. See Seidel, Patent Litigations, 1 PRAc. LAW. 49, 51 (March 1955) ; HoAR, PATENT
TACTICS AND LAW 225 (3d ed. 1950) ("Very often a desirable venue can be obtained
by suing a distributor or customer of the real infringer.") The courts have not remained
unaware of the reasons behind the abundance of suits against distributors instead of
manufacturers. Bros, Inc. v. W. E. Grace Mfg. Co., 261 F.2d 428, 430 (5th Cir. 1958);
Rayco Mfg. Co. v. Chicopee Mfg. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 588, 590-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
20. There is some conflict within the federal courts as to the means by which control
is proved. Courts have sometimes included in the decree a statement to the effect that
the defense was controlled by another person. E.g., RCA v. E. J. Edmond & Co., 20 F.2d
929 (S.D.N.Y. 1927); Brock v. Brown, 138 F. Supp. 628 (D. Md. 1956); Eagle Mfg.
Co. v. Miller, 41 Fed. 351 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1890), rev'd on other grounds, 151 U.S. 186
(1891). Exactly what legal effect this finding would have in a subsequent action by the
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judicated in the prior suit.21 The patentee has thereby succeeded in litigating
the most crucial elements of a patent infringement suit in a jurisdiction of his
own choosing.22 The possibility that the distributor, effectively immune from
liability under the judgment,23 will not present the strongest case in defense,
and the likelihood that an adverse judgment would seriously endanger the
reputation of the product,24 motivates the manufacturer to assume control
over the litigation.2 5 If he then receives a favorable judgment, the manufac-
plaintiff against the controlling non-party is not certain. In purely in personam actions,
courts would seem to have the power to make conclusive findings only against those who
are parties to the action and only as to those issues on which both parties have had an
opportunity for a full hearing. Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350, 368 (1873). With
this problem in mind, Judge Learned Hand, speaking for the court in Minneapolis-
Honeywell Regulator Co. v. Thermoco, Inc., 116 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1941), deleted from
the lower court's decree a comment on the manufacturer's control of the defense, it
being unnecessary "to the disposition of the case between the parties." Id. at
848. Attempting to distinguish N.O. Nelson Mfg. Co. v. Myers & Bros. Co., 25 F.2d
659 (6th Cir. 1928) as a case in which the fact of control was noted in the original
judgment, the court became involved in the rather tortuous distinction between "record
of fact" and "finding of fact." 116 F.2d at 847. The court seemed to be suggesting that
the "fact" of control mentioned in such judgments was not conclusive in a later suit.
At least one court has explicity taken this position. Marshall Metal Prods. Inc. v.
Aghnides, 126 F. Supp. 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
Subsequent decisions have assumed that Minneapolis-Honeywell renders improper any
inquiry into control in the orginal action. Maulsby v. Conzevoy, 161 F.2d 165 (9th
Cir. 1947); Lip Lure, Inc. v. Bloomingdale Bros., Inc., 27 F. Supp. 811 (S.D.N.Y. 1939)
(Federal Rule 34 cannot be invoked to prove non-party control) ; Prosperity Co.
v. Saint Joe Machs., Inc., 2 F.R.D. 299 (W.D. Mich. 1942). Contra, Aghnides v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 140 F. Supp. 582, 587 (1956). The existence of control is properly considered
in a later action against the controlling non-party, for it raises issues of fact as to which
evidence may be adduced and a trial before a jury may be had. See Marshall Metal Prods.,
Inc. v. Aghnides, 126 F. Supp. 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Dillard v. McKnight, 34 Cal. 2d
209, 209 P.2d 387 (1949).
21. See note 17 supra.
22. The popularity of this practice is evidence of the ease with which patentees
circumvent Congress' intended limitation upon choice of venue set out in § 1400(b)
(quoted at note 35 infra).
23. Bros, Inc. v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co., 261 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1958); 4 MOORE,
FEDERAL PRAcTicE 24.09, at 50 (1948) [hereinafter cited as MOORE].
24. In the same way that "every patent owner has an interest in keeping the reputa-
tion of his patent from the stain of a judgment of invalidity" even though such judgment
will not conclude him directly, A.L. Smith Iron Co. v. Dickson, 141 F.2d 3, 6 (2d Cir. 1944),
a manufacturer will wish to avoid an adjudication of infringement against his product.
If the finding of infringement is made against a seller or user of the product, it will not
bind the manufacturer in a subsequent suit. But it is likely that potential customers will be
discouraged from purchasing a product the use or sale of which may subject them to
an infringement suit. Although the manufacturer might offer protection in such suits,
the customer would still be denied the right to use or sell the product should it be held to
infringe.
25. Naturally, circumstances may be such that the manufacturer will not wish to
incur the expenses of litigation and will merely pay whatever damages are assessed
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turer can not only plead that judgment in estoppel if subsequently sued by
the patentee, 20 but he could intervene in later suits against his customers and
have them dismissed as well.
2 7
Formal intervention, often available to the manufacturer under the Federal
Rules,28 presents a possible alternative to control. Though all the privileges
of control would inure to an intervening manufacturer, this course of action
is not without its disadvantages. Intervention may subject him to direct
liability for his own acts of infringement 29 as well as indirect liability for those
against the distributor. See, e.g., I.T.S. Rubber Co. v. Essex Rubber Co., 272 U.S. 429
(1926). But if he fails to defend that suit and the validity of the patent is upheld, he
might well find it more difficult to defend if later sued directly. Though the decision of an-
other court on the patent will not be binding against a different defendant "as a case of stare
decisis," Aeration Processes, Inc. v. Lange, 196 F.2d 981, 982 (8th Cir. 1952), the court
may find the prior adjudication "strongly persuasive under the doctrine of comity."
Williams v. Hughes Tool Co., 186 F.2d 278, 281 (10th Cir. 1950). Accord, Koolvent Metal
Awning Corp. of America v. Graham, 82 F. Supp. (N.D. Ohio 1948).
26. E.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours v. Sylvania Industrial Corp., 122 F.2d 400 (4th
Cir. 1941) (manufacturer defended distributor in trademark suit) ; Doherty Research Co.
v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 107 F.2d 548 (7th Cir. 1939).
27. Continuous Extract Press Corp. v. Eastern Cotton Oil Co., 264 Fed. 340
(E.D.N.C. 1920). See also, Kessler v. Eldred, 206 U.S. 285 (1907).
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 24. The manufacturer does not have an absolute right to intervene,
4 MOORE 11 24.09, and the court may deny him this privilege if it feels that intervention
would enlarge the scope of the litigation, Finch v. Gilman Bros. Co., 11 F.R.D. 198
(D. Conn. 1951), or if there is no showing that the intervener's interests will not otherwise
be adequately represented, Union Nat'l Bank v. Superior Steel Corp., 9 F.R.D. 124 (W.D.
Pa. 1949). But absent similar circumstances, the manufacturer has usually been permitted
to intervene. Chandler & Price Co. v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 296 U.S. 53 (1935);
Foote v. Parsons Non-Skid Co., 196 Fed. 951 (6th Cir. 1912); Wenborne-Karpen Dryer
Co. v. Dort Motor Car Co., 300 Fed. 404 (E.D. Mich. 1924) ; Curran v. St. Charles Car
Co., 32 Fed. 835 (E.D. Mo 1887).
29. Apparently this point has not been decided. It is arguable, at least, that the
patent venue statute, see note 35 infra, would bar inquiry into the manufacturer's offense.
On the other hand, the act of intervention might reasonably be construed as a waiver of
the privilege accorded by the statute. Two considerations support this construction. First,
once a court has acquired jurisdiction over a controversy, the venue statute cannot be
invoked to defeat a counterclaim. 3 MooRE 1 13.22. Second, the claim against the manu-
facturer would present issues of fact and law closely similar to those involved in the
original complaint, and thus would hardly expand the scope of the litigation. Support,
by analogy, is found in a case in which the government was joined as a third-party de-
fendant under Federal Rule 14(a). Abramovitch v. United States Lines, 174 F. Supp.
587 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). When the plaintiff then attempted to amend his complaint in order
to obtain damages from the government, it was argued that venue was improper for that
claim. The court allowed the amendment, saying that the venue statute should not apply
to a claim by a plaintiff against a third-party defendant. Moore suggests a similar result.
3 MOORE 11 14.28[3]. The limitation in carrying this reasoning over to intervention is that
under Rule 14(a), the plaintiff's claim against the third-party defendant must arise "out
of the transaction or occurence" which is the subject matter of the original action, over
which the court already has asserted jurisdiction, while the patentee's claim against the
intervening manufacturer would be a separate cause of action, albeit presenting a common
question of law or fact as required by Rule 24(b) (2).
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of the distributor, while denying him the right to assert counterclaims inde-
pendent of those available to the original defendant.3 0 Perhaps even more
important, if, through intervention, the manufacturer became a party, he would
have no alternative but to finish the litigation or submit to the judgment. As
a controlling non-party, however, he is free to evaluate the trend of the pro-
ceedings and, if circumstances warrant, to conceal his control or withdraw
completely, perhaps thereby avoiding a finding of control which would bind
him in subsequent litigation.31
On occasion, however, the patentee has attempted to join the manufacturer
as a party in the original suit by requesting the court to consider his control
a general appearance.32 In Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc.,33 plaintiff
brought suit in Indiana against a user of an allegedly infringing product and
attempted to join an Illinois manufacturer prior to trial, the latter admitting
control of the defense. The district court, affirmed by a divided Court of Ap-
peals,3 4 granted the motion to quash service and dismissed the manufacturer
30. The leading case is Chandle- & Price Co. v. Brandtien & Kluge, Inc., 296 U.S.
53 (1935), in which a manufacturer intervened in an infringement action against one of
his distributors and counterclaimed on the basis that the patentee's device infringed one
of the manufacturer's products. In dismissing the counterclaim, the court said that the
intervenor was not entitled to come into the suit for the purpose of having adjudicated
a controversy solely between it and plaintiff. Issues tendered by or arising out of
plaintiff's bill may not by the intervenor be so enlarged. It is limited to the field of
litigation open to the original parties. Id. at 57-58.
Accord, Angier v. Anaconda Wire & Cable Co., 48 F.2d 612 (D. Del. 1931). At least one
writer has argued that the Federal Rules have broadened the intervenor's right to counter-
claim. Willis, Procedure in Patent Cases Under the New Federal Rules, 30 GEo. L.J. 348,
357 (1942). Moore contends that if general intervention has been allowed, the intervenor
has the same right of counterclaim as an original party. 4 MooRE f1 24.17, at 127.
31. No cases have been found addressing themselves to the situation where a controlling
non-party discontinues his control in the hope of avoiding a finding of control and the
consequent estoppel effect of an unfavorable judgment. The argument in his favor would
be that he did not receive a full hearing on all the issues and thus is not subject to the
decree. But there should clearly come a point in the proceedings when his conduct up to that
time would be sufficient to establish control, whether or not he subsequently withdrew. Other-
wise, the controlling non-party would have a distinct advantage in being able to evaluate the
litigation as it proceeded and terminate his control if he anticipated an adverse decision. The
simplest and perhaps fairest solution would be to say that once the non-party has assumed
control of the defense, subsequent withdrawal from the action will not protect him from the
consequences of the judgment. If we assume that control was originally undertaken in self-
interest, see notes 24 and 25 supra and accompanying text, then the non-party should no more
be able, by withdrawal, to avoid a final judgment than should a party.
32. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Metlon Corp., 281 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1960); S.S.
Kresge Co. v. Winget Kickernick Co., 96 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1938); Freeman-Sweet Co.
v. Luminous Unit Co., 264 Fed. 107 (7th Cir. 1920).
33. 365 U.S. 260 (1961).
34. Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 279 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1960). Appeal was
allowed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1958), the district court having certified that the
order dismissing the manufacturer from the suit involved a controlling question of law and
an appeal would materially advance the ultimate determination of the litigation.
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from the action. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, holding that,
under the patent venue provision of the United States Code,35 Indiana was an
improper venue for suit against the manufacturer. The Court considered
itself bound by the "clear and specific"36 legislative mandate of section 1400 (b),
a statute described in a prior opinion as "the sole and exclusive provision con-
trolling venue in patent infringement actions."3 7 Denying that it was exalting
form over substance, the Court held that it could not ignore the unambiguous
language of the statute in favor of some overriding public policy.38
Presumably, the Court emphasized the purpose and meaning of section
1400(b) in order to demonstrate that waiver of venue is not to be lightly as-
sumed in patent cases. But notwithstanding this emphasis, the fact remains
that venue is only a "privilege . . . [which] may be lost . . . by submission
through conduct." 39 The determination of whether or not this privilege has
been lost should be based upon analysis of the conduct involved, viewed against
the background of the appropriate legislative policy. If Congress had indeed
considered the problem of non-party control in passing 1400(b), then the
Court's reluctance to countenance this means of avoiding the clear legislative
mandate would have been justified. But despite the obvious implication of
the Court's statement that "the practice complained of here was not at all un-
usual at the time of this statute's passage,"40  House debate on the bill gives
no indication that the practice of non-party control in patent suits had ever
been brought to the attention of Congress.41 And even if Congress had been
made aware of this practice, it is hardly likely that the threat of joining a non-
party would have been considered any more deserving of legislative interven-
tion than was the entire practice of non-party control which so freely per-
mitted patentees to circumvent the restrictions of 1400(b).4 It might be
further argued that if Congress limited the appropriate venue for infringement
suits because of serious concern about protecting alleged patent infringers
from being sued in remote and inconvenient forums, a very restrictive ap-
proach to waiver of 1400(b) would be justified. The reasoning would be that
waiver of venue should not be readily inferred where it appears that Congress
had considered the possible abuses which might result from an increase of the
available forums for instituting patent suits. But legislative history again fails
to support the Court's position. The reports disclose that the House was
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1958) provides as follows:
Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where
the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and
has a regular and established place of business.
36. Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260, 262 (1961).
37. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 229 (1957).
38. Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260, 265 (1961).
39. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 168 (1939).
40. Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260, 262-63 (1961).
41. 29 CONG. REc. 1900 (1897).
42. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
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aware of a conflict of decisions in the federal courts,43 some of which had
allowed venue wherever the infringer could be found, regardless of where his
established place of business was located or where the infringement had taken
place.4 4 At least one decision, however, had confined jurisdiction to the district
in which the infringer resided,45 a serious handicap to a patentee when the in-
fringment occurred at a considerable distance from that residence. Congress
was apparently motivated to "define the exact jurisdiction of the federal courts
in actions to enforce patent rights" 46 by a desire to resolve this conflict among
the circuits, and not by a desire to limit the expansive nature of patent venue.
Section 1400(b), the statutory resolution of this conflict, adopted a position
intermediate to the extremes represented by the conflicting cases.
In this light, 1400(b) does not appear to express any clear congressional
attitude towards the practice of control. The Court, therefore, might reason-
ably have inquired further into the nature of the manufacturer's conduct to de-
termine whether his joinder would have, in fact, contravened the general
policy underlying the venue requirement. Such was the inquiry made in Neirbo
Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,47 in which a narrow reading of an equally
"clear and specific" venue statute would have prohibited jurisdiction.46 But
in that case the Court said that one who had consented to service of process
in a given state had waived his objections to federal venue in that state.49 As a re-
sult it was held that the defendant could be sued in a district where service was
proper although it was not, as the venue statute required, "the residence of either
the plaintiff or the defendant."50 A finding of waiver in the instant case would no
more have been "an intrusion into the legislative field" 5' 1 than was the compar-
able finding in Neirbo. In fact, such a finding would be in strict accord with the
Neirbo Court's observation as to the nature of venue: "the locality of a law suit-
the place where judicial authority may be exercised-though defined by legisla-
tion relates to the convenience of the litigants and as such is subject to their dis-
position."52 The manufacturer could hardly be heard to complain about the in-
43. 29 CONG. REC. 1900 (1897) (remarks of Mr. Mitchell).
44. Earl v. Southern Pac. Co., 75 Fed. 609 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896) ; National Button
Works v. Wade, 72 Fed. 298 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1896) ; Smith v. Sargent Mfg. Co., 67 Fed.
801 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1895).
45. Halstead v. Manning, Bowman & Co., 34 Fed. 565 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888). A full
list of the cases which prompted the bill is set out at 29 CoNG. REc. 1901 (1897).
46. Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 565 (1942).
47. 308 U.S. 165 (1939).
48. The statute required that diversity actions be brought in the district wherein
either the plaintiff or the defendant resided. 25 Stat. 434 (1888) (now 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (a)
(1958)). The action, based on diversity, was tried in New York, although neither of the
parties was a resident of that state. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S.
165, 167 (1939).
49. The defendant had been required by state law to appoint an agent to receive service
of process. The Court held that this consent to be sued in the state courts extended to
the federal courts within that state, objections to venue notwithstanding. Id. at 175.
50. 25 Stat. 434 (1888) (now 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1958)).
51. Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260, 263 (1961).
52. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 168 (1939).
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convenience of venue in a forum in which he is already fully participating on
behalf of a party. If, then, convenience to the litigants, the essence of venue, 58
is not a significant factor in Schnell, 1400(b) should hardly be dispositive of
the problem; other considerations, looking both to relevant judicial pronounce-
ments and to the possible consequences of joinder, should govern instead.54
Previous courts, confronted with situations seemingly indistinguishable from
that presented in Schnell, have, with few exceptions, declined to extend their
jurisdiction over the non-party.65 The exceptions are in large part attributable
to the misconstruction of an early federal case, Eagle Mfg. Co. v. Miller.5
In response to a request by the patentee that the judgment run against the con-
trolling manufacturer, the court stated in its decree that the manufacturing
corporation was the principal party in interest and thus as fully "bound by
the results ...of the litigation" as if it were a party of record; "for that,
in effect, is only stating, in set phrase, the force which the decree would in
fact have as against the corporation. ' ' 57 Despite a persuasive argument by
another federal court six years later that Eagle had only intended to prescribe
the usual estoppel effects of non-party control,58 a few courts have cited the
case as support for allowing a decree to run directly against a non-party.59 The
53. See generally, 1 MooRE II 0.140.
54. It would seem that so long as Schnell remains good law, joinder of the non-party
in patent litigation would be largly precluded. But cases in which § 1400(b) was not
determinative would not be ruled by the Court's opinion in Schnell. This would include
all cases of control outside the patent field, see note 10 supra, and those patent suits in which
the controlling manufacturer did business within the forum state, thus satisfying the venue
statute, but for some reason had not been properly served.
55. E.g., Overman Cushion Tire Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 48 F.2d 213 (S.D.
N.Y. 1930), aff'd per curiam, 48 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1931); Brock v. Brown, 138 F. Supp.
628 (D. Md. 1956) ; Van Kannel Revolving Door Co. v. Winton Hotel Co., 263 Fed. 988
(N.D. Ohio 1920). But see, cases cited at note 59 infra.
56. 41 Fed. 351 (S.D. Iowa 1890), rev'd on other grounds, 151 U.S. 186 (1894).
57. Id. at 357-58.
58. In Bidwell v. Toledo Consol. St. Ry., 72 Fed. 10 (N.D. Ohio 1896) the court
argued that the decree in Eagle "bound" the manufacturer only insofar as it constituted
an estoppel in future litigation. It was towards this end alone that the decree recorded the
manufacturer's participation, for the cases cited in the opinion could support no broader
interpretation of the decree.
59. Dicks Press Guard Mfg. Co. v. Bowen, 229 Fed. 193 (N.D.N.Y. 1916), in permitting
joinder of a controlling manufacturer, cited Eagle as its only support. A subsequent decision,
Radio Corp. of America v. E.J. Edmond & Co., 20 F.2d 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1927), in denying
a similar motion, ruled that Dicks Press could not control because the pafentee's motion in
that case had been unopposed, and the court had not been referred to a controlling
precedent, Parsons Non-Skid Co. v. E.J. Wallis Co., 176 Fed. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1909).
Again in reliance on Eagle, as well as Dicks Press, as sole federal authorities, the court
in Ocean Ace. & Guar. Corp. v. Felgemaker, 143 F.2d 950 (6th Cir. 1944), allowed a
controlling insurance company to be joined as a party, holding that the company, by its
control, had effectively appeared in the action and submitted to the court's jurisdiction.
But factors in addition to control might have influenced the court's decision. An Ohio
statute, GENERAL CODE OF OHIo, § 9510-4 (now OHIO Rav. CODE ANN. § 3929.06 (1953)),
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problem was brought before the Supreme Court in G. & C. Merriam Co. v.
Saalfield,60 a case quoted extensively by the Court in Schnell. An action for
copyright infringement was brought against Saalfield, distributor of a diction-
ary published by Ogilvie. Following trial but prior to the entry of a final de-
cree, plaintiff sought by means of a supplemental bill, to join Ogilvie, who was
allegedly controlling the defense. The Court affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the bill, though the grounds of the decision are unclear. The
opinion does state-apparently in dictum-that control by itself is not suffi-
cient to bring one within the court's in personam jurisdiction."' Later federal
cases, addressing themselves specifically to this point, have generally con-
curred.62.
The question raised in Schnell, however, cannot be directly answered by
the precedents. Whereas in Schnell the patentee attempted to join the manu-
facturer before commencement of the trial, in the previous suits the re-
quest to bind the controlling non-party by an in personam decree came at the
conclusion of the proceedings. 63 Nevertheless, though confronted only with
post-trial requests to bind, these courts wrote in terms so broad as to imply
disapproval of all efforts to join, regardless of the point at which they were
made.6" In the pre-Schnell cases, the plaintiff in effect asked that the court
provided for direct action against the insurer when a judgment against the insured remained
unsatisfied, and a clause in the insurance contract made the company directly liable to
the insured's judgment creditor. In addition, the amount of damages against the company
was already fixed by the award against the insured, and the company conceded that
it had no defenses but the jurisdiction question. Though these considerations hardly
answer the jurisdictional objections, see notes 68-71 infra and accompanying text, they
might well have led the court to conclude that the merits of the controversy between
the company and the plaintiff had been substantially resolved and that a second action
between the judgment creditor and the insurer would be a mere formality.
In allowing a decree to run against a controlling manufacturer, the court in Redman
v. Stedman Mfg. Co., 154 F. Supp. 378 (M.D.N.C. 1957), aff'd, 257 F.2d 867 (4th Cir.
1958), enforced, 181 F. Supp. 5 (M.D.N.C. 1960), remained within this succession of cases
by drawing strong support from Ocean Accident. But the manufacturer failed to attack that
portion of the decree on appeal, and that same Court of Appeals has since held, Dow Chem.
Co. v. Metlon Corp., 281 F. 2d 292 (4th Cir. 1960), that control does not permit one to be
made a party
60. 241 U.S. 22 (1916).
61. Id. at 29.
62. See cases cited at note 55 supra.
63. Ibid.
64. In Gulf Smokeless Coal Co. v. Sutton, Steele & Steele, 35 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1929),
the court said that
the fact that one has assumed and is conducting the defense of a patent infringement
suit in behalf of the defendant does not justify his being made a party defendant in
derogation of ... [ § 1400 (b) ].
These words were cited with approval in Dow Chem. Co. v. Metlon Corp., 281 F.2d 292,
298 (4th Cir. 1960). See Overman Cushion Tire Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
48 F.2d 213, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1930) ; Parsons Non-Skid Co. v. E.J. Willis Co., 176 Fed. 176
(S.D.N.Y. 1909) ; Freeman-Sweet Co. v. Luminous Unit Co., 264 Fed. 107 (7th Cir. 1919).
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look behind the formal record and note the extent of the non-party's participa-
tion. It was argued that, in exercising complete control over the defendant's
suit, such person had a full opportunity to be heard and therefore effectively
submitted himself to the court's jurisdiction. With near unanimity and a con-
spicuous absence of reasoned analysis, court after court announced the dogma
that one does not make a general appearance by conducting a lawsuit in behalf
of a nominal party.65 The force of the judgment, as one court put it,
does not go beyond creating an estoppel in subsequent litigation between
... [the controlling non-party and his adversary] concerning the same mat-
ters .... [Control] does not make . . . [the non-party] a party to the
prior suit.6
Perhaps the result reached in these cases reflected a vague, but not entirely
baseless, reluctance to render a judgment against one who had not been named
in the complaint and who had neither filed an answer nor made argument in
his own name. 7 The courts, moreover, may have been troubled by the pros-
pect of permitting a personal judgment to issue from proceedings during
which the person had not been formally brought within the court's jurisdic-
tion. 68 If these reservations indeed underlay the courts' decisions-and they
hardly found their way into written opinions-they still do not satisfy, for they
are only expressions of legalistic conclusions not independently persuasive. It
is hardly appropriate to talk in traditional terms when referring to the dis-
tinctly unique phenomenon of non-party control. How meaningful is it to
argue that the controlling non-party is not subject to the court's jurisdiction or
is not appearing in his own name when his interests are being effectively repre-
sented in open court, and when another court, in recognition of that fact, makes
the judgment conclusive upon him as to those issues actually litigated? This
need not invalidate the concepts of appearance, jurisdiction, and parties in this
area; it is only meant to imply that when an attempt is made to employ these
concepts outside of their historical context, inquiry must be made into their
underlying purpose.
Had this course been followed, the courts might well have found cogent sup-
port for their conclusions. For a real threat to due process was, in fact, pre-
sented by the attempted post-trial joinder of the non-party in that such joinder
would have infringed his right to a full hearing. During the course of the
trial, the non-party, because he is participating only -in behalf of the named
65. Ibid
66. S.S. Kresge Co. v. Winget Kickernick Co., 96 F.2d 978, 989 (8th Cir. 193&).
67. See 1 BLACK, JUDGMENTS § 219 (1891). But that courts may fruitfully probe the sub-
stance beneath these formalities is borne out by the result in Louisville & Nashville R.R.
v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230 (1900), discussed at note 71 infra.
68. See, e.g., National Exch. Bank v. Wiley, 195 U.S. 257, 269 (1904):
It is thoroughly settled that a personal judgment against one not before the court by
actual service of process, or who did not appear in person or by an authorized attorney,
would be invalid as not being in conformity with due process of law.
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defendant, is restricted to raising only those defenses available to the de-
fendant. Any defense which might ordinarily be available to him but not to
the defendant may, therefore, not be asserted. 9 Assuming that the full hear-
ing requirement of due process guarantees a party the right to present all
relevant defenses, 70 joinder of the controlling non-party at the end of the trial,
during which he has been unable to plead personal defenses, would be constitu-
tionally prohibited.7 1
None of the arguments advanced as a basis for the courts' decisions rejecting
attempted post-trial joinder would militate against attempts to join prior to
trial; one who was joined at that time would be formally before the court
throughout the proceedings and would naturally be accorded the full rights of
a party. If any of these arguments did in fact influence the courts, the breadth
of their decisions seems only to indicate an absence of consideration rather
than a disapproval of pre-trial attempts to join. On the other hand, the courts'
refusal to include controlling non-parties within their decrees does not mean
that they failed to recognize the very real sense in which non-parties had made
substantial use of the judicial process to protect their own interests. In fact,
to the extent that courts did impose the consequences of collateral estoppel
upon the controlling non-party, it was recognized that, as to the issues actually
litigated, such non-party had had the same opportunity to be heard as a
party.72 If, then, non-parties were given an opportunity to be heard on all
69. Since he is not a party of record, the non-party has no right to make defenses
which he alone can assert. Thus, in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co.,
32 F. Supp. 304 (D. N.J. 1940), the court found that the controlling manufacturer could
not have raised the defenses of laches and estoppel in the original suit because they could
not be claimed by the named defendant, his distributor. They were, therefore, available to
him in a subsequent suit in which he was named as a defendant. But see Warford Corp. v.
Bryan Screw Mach. Prods. Co., 44 F.2d 713 (6th Cir. 1930).
70. See generally, Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Say. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930);
Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. City of Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918).
71. But see Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230 (1900), where it
was held that, though not a named party in the action, the Louisville & Nashville had had an
opportunity to present all defenses. The Supreme Court felt itself bound by the Kentucky
court's finding that the railroad, by virtue of its ownership of the disputed property, its
control over the litigation, and the substantial liquidation of the nominal defendant, had
made itself the real defendant, having been an actor in the state courts and having sought
by all available means to defeat the complaint. See Schmidt v. Louisville, C. & L. Ry., 99
Ky. 143, 35 S.W. 135 (1896). The Court refused to find that the Louisville & Nashville
had been denied the right to litigate personal defenses when none had in fact been proffered.
In addition,
the Louisville & Nashville was made a party defendant to the rule [to show cause] in
the most technical sense, and was actually served. It made answer and asserted its
setoff. The mere fact that the proceeding to hold it liable was by rule does not con-
flict with due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, for, as we have seen, forms
of procedure in the state courts are not controlled by the Fourteenth Amendment,
provided the fundamental rights secured by the amendment are not denied. Louisville
& Nashville RR v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 238 (1900).
72. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
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issues and appeared as named defendants throughout, there would seemingly
be no due process objection to subjecting them to the court's judgment; when
this is accomplished by joinder before trial, it represents but a short and logical
step from present judicial treatment of controlling non-parties.
Concededly, the traditional notions of service of process and general appear-
ance, the methods by which jurisdiction has been historically invoked,73 do not
justify extension of the court's jurisdiction over the controlling non-party.
The nonresident manufacturer is, by hypothesis, beyond the reach of the
court's process. 74 And however much the manufacturer's extensive use of the
courts to protect his own interest might resemble the sine qua non of a general
appearance, namely argument to the merits,7 5 such an appearance was tradi-
tionally entered only by one who was named in the complaint and who argued
before the court in his own name.7 6 But even if the manufacturer's actions do
not come within the strict requirement of a general appearance, jurisdiction
should not thereby be precluded. The court's right to extend its jurisdiction
to a controlling non-party should depend on a consideration of the over all
character of his conduct. And inquiry in this direction leads to the observation
that the non-party acts in a way normally reserved for parties of record. It is
hardly a distortion of jurisdictional concepts to bring formally before the court
one who has made or admits intent to make full use of its processes in his
own interest. Indeed, it may be argued that the assertion of jurisdiction over
the controlling non-party can find justification in a realistic approach to the
meaning of general appearance. The term "general appearance" states a legal
conclusion,77 merely signifying that a person has taken sufficient action before
the court so that it will exercise in personam jurisdiction without valid service
of process. So viewed, the term is appropriately applied to the situation of
non-party control.
73. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
74. The fact that the manufacturer is represented by counsel through the nominal de-
fendant is unimportant. As a matter of judicial convenience, courts grant immunity from
service of process to attorneys who are in a jurisdiction conducting another action. See 2
MooRE if 4.20.
75. See, e.g., Southern Lands, Inc. v. Henderson, 24 F. Supp. 835, 840-41 (W.D. La.
1938).
76. 1 BLACK, JUDGMENTS § 212 (1891) ; Burdick, Service As a Requirement of Due
Process in Actions In Personan, 20 MicH. L. REv. 422, 425 (1922).
77. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules, a defendant had to enter a special
appearance in order to preserve his objections to the court's jurisdiction. If he first attempted
to plead to the merits, he was said to have entered a general apperance and waived those
objections. Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U.S. 476, 479 (1878). But the Federal Rules abolished the
distinction between the general and special appearance. 2 Moore if 12.12. The term general
appearance, therefore, does no more than state a legal conclusion, namely that one is before
the court and can no longer contest its jurisdiction, an occurance possible under the Rules
only when an attack upon jurisdiction is not timely made. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h). The
notion of a general appearance as a plea to the merits which will confer jurisdiction upon the
court is no longer accurate under the Rules. The term exists merely to describe an alternative
to service of process as a means by which jurisdiction over the person is acquired, though
the means is substantively rather vague.
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Joinder of the controlling manufacturer could be effected in the following
manner. The patentee would request the opposing counsel to indicate who
was controlling the defense, and if control by the manufacturer were thereby
revealed, the patentee would move for joinder. Two considerations dictate
that this procedure be permitted only before trial: first, the court has an in-
terest in the open participation of all parties from the start of the action, since
rights can be adjudicated with greater certainty and fairness if the parties
to the dispute appear openly in court throughout the proceedings. Second,
if the patentee could request joinder at any point in the process, he would
likely postpone that request until such time as the outcome of the litigation
were reasonably foreseeable. In all fairness, the status of a participant in an
adversary proceeding should not be determined by the tactical interests of his
opponent.
78
It is expected that the patentee would, in most instances, seek to join the
manufacturer, since this procedure offers him the opportunity, heretofore un-
available under the patent venue statute,79 to proceed directly against the manu-
facturer for compensatory and injunctive relief in the jurisdiction of his choice.
From the manufacturer's point of view, an admission of control following a
pre-trial request for such admission would usually be advantageous. Should
he win after having admitted control, the possibility of a later suit by the
patentee against the manufacturer or any of his customers in regard to the
same product would be effectively foreclosed.80 But should the manufacturer
win after having denied control, equitable considerations would require that
he be estopped from later pleading it. In that event, the manufacturer might
reasonably expect to face the same patentee complaining about the same in-
fringement by the same product in a subsequent action. Few manufacturers
would be willing, even if able, to incur the vast expenses of controlling a patent
suit and then deprive themselves of one of its most important benefits. On
the other hand, because of obligations to his distributor and possible danger
to the reputation of his product, complete abandonment of control is usually
not a practical alternative. If the manufacturer assumes control but, for
some reason, denies such participation, it is questionable whether the patentee
would be able to prove control at the beginning of the suit and before trial.
Since at that stage there could be little evidence of actual control, much re-
liance would have to be placed upon evidence of intent, at best an incon-
clusive basis on which to rest a finding of fact. There is the possibility of
waiting until a later point in the proceedings when retrospective evidence
of control might be available to the patentee. But considerations of judicial
orderliness, including the impropriety of interrupting the trial to delve into a
collateral issue, warn against such a procedure.
78. Fairness to the non-party also demands that, after joinder is requested, he be
given a reasonable time prior to trial in which to make any change in his defense that his
new status might require.
79. See note 35 supra.
80. See note 27 supra.
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Several policy considerations argue for the court's assumption of juris-
diction over the controlling non-party. Joinder of the manufacturer would
eliminate the second suit that a patentee, victorious in an action against a dis-
tributor, usually brings against the manufacturer who controlled on behalf of
the distributor."' Since the manufacturer is estopped from raising those
defenses argued in the prior suit,8 2 such suit is a needless waste of time and
resources, a luxury which an already over-crowded court system can ill
afford.8 3  Additionally, the oft-deplored game of hide-and-seek so common
to the control situation would be eliminated.84 Upon the admission of con-
trol, those whose ultimate interests are at stake would become parties of
record and fully and directly subject to the court's powers. It might be
argued that joinder would severely handicap the manufacturer, since it
would deprive him of his right to withdraw control should his relationship
to the distributor be so altered during the course of the trial as to remove his
reasons for control.85 The fact remains, however, that his decision to assume
control was largely based on an interest in protecting the good name of his
product and securing the benefits of estoppel in subsequent suits, and that
interest remains despite any changes in his relationship to the distributor.8 "
An increased incentive to forum-shop might provide a more substantial
objection to the proposed method of joinder. Now that he can acquire
81. See, e.g., Warford Corp. v. Bryan Screw Mach. Prods. Co., 44 F.2d 713 (6th Cir.
1930). Success in a suit against a distributor does not aid the patentee in halting the
manufacturer's sales to other distributors. Because an injunction requires in personam
jurisdiction, 7 MooRE f 65.13, such sales can only be enjoined by a direct suit against the
manufacturer. "[I]t is not the act described which the decree may forbid, but only that act
when the defendant does it." Alemite Mfg. Co. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 833 (2d Cir. 1930).
82. See note 17 supra.
83. See generally, ZEISEL, KALVN & BUCH1OLz, DELAY IN THE COURT (1959).
84. One court has summed up in the following terms the efforts of opposing counsel to
avoid the estoppel effects of an adverse judgment:
In court, counsel for the real party in interest, with somewhat the same skill as
an ostrich seeking to conceal itself, assumes a stranger-like attitude toward the
client that hired and paid him. If successful however in the litigation, he immediately
seeks to obtain an extension of the effect of the decree to his real, but unidentified
client, who becomes as prominent now as he was secreted before. On the other hand,
if defeated, his real client is not bound, so it is asserted, because not before the court.
His adversary takes exactly the opposite position. He knows the true status of
opposing counsel, knows that his adversary's ostrich-like efforts to conceal his
true relations are quite as ineffectual as they are grotesque. He, too, awaits the
outcome of the litigation before he becomes certain of his knowledge of the true
representation of his adversary. Doherty Reasearch Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co.,
107 F.2d 548, 549 (7th Cir. 1939).
85. Brief for Respondent, p. 5, Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260
(1961).
86. If the manufacturer were confronted with an uncooperative or disloyal customer
and injustice were resulting, the court could possibly issue a protective order or even transfer
the manufacturer's part of the case to a more proper forum. Brief for Petitioners, p. 6,
Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260 (1961).
1961] 1181
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
in personam jurisdiction over a manufacturer in a forum other than those
allowed by 1400(b), it is arguable that the patentee will be more tempted
than ever to seek out a forum favorable to patents. Whether, in fact, the
temptation will be much greater than that which already exists and finds
gratification in suits against distributors rather than manufacturers 8 is a
matter of conjecture. In any case, it can be mitigated by forbidding the
patentee to use his extra-statutory forum to present claims not involving
the same product which prompted the suit against the distributor. Similar
to the manner in which it presently exercises discretion under the Federal
Rule governing intervention, the district court could prevent the litigation
from expanding far beyond the scope of the original complaint.88
Moreover, a liberal interpretation of the Declaratory judgment Act 81 will
help offset whatever advantages may accrue to the patentee by virtue of his abil-
ity to forum-shop. Although the plaintiff has the traditional right to institute suit
in the forum of his choice, the criteria for decision should relate to con-
venience rather than to any supposed predispositions of the courts.90 Recog-
nizing, however, that if these predispositions exist, they will not be ignored,
little else can be done, absent remedial legislation restricting the accessibility
of alternative forums, than to give the parties an equal opportunity to avail
themselves of favored jurisdictions.91 Thus, if the manufacturer can institute
87. See notes 19 and 20 supra and accompanying text.
88. Under Federal Rule 24,
the court may properly deny or limit permissive intervention where it feels that the
interposition of counterclaims not related to the matters at issue between the plaintiff
and the defendant would unduly delay or complicate the determination of those
issues. 4 MooPax 24.17 at 135.
To prevent the litigation from proliferating, it might occasionally be necessary for the
court to impose limitations on the scope of the evidence even where only the original pro-
duct is involved. If, for example, the distributor's infringement consists of using the manu-
facturer's product in a patented process, a decree in favor of the patentee would only enjoin
that particular use, leaving unaffected those who use the manufacturer's product in different
but nevertheless infringing ways. Assuming the controlling manufacturer's joinder, the
patentee would wish to enjoin the manufacturer from contributing to these other infringing
uses. This would require the introduction of a great deal of additional evidence in order
first to show that these uses were in fact infringing. Though this procedure would doubtlessly
be open to the patentee in a direct suit against the manufacturer, it should be denied him
when he is confronting the manufacturer in a suit orginally prosecuted against the distribu-
tor. In the large number of cases where a distributor merely uses or resells the product in
the same form that he receives it from the manufacturer, this problem will not be raised,
and an injunction against the distributor and manufacturer will prevent sales to other
distributors.
89. 28U.S.C. § 2201 (1958).
90. One district judge has remarked that "a litigant is open to the charge of forum-
shopping whenever he chooses a forum with slight connection to the factual circumstances
surrounding his suit." Rayco Mfg. Co. v. Chicopee Mfg. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 588, 593
(S.D.N.Y. 1957).
91. No claim is made that giving the manufacturer the power to forum-shop on a
competitive basis with the patentee will further the Congressional policy, embodied in §
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a declaratory judgment suit before the patentee can commence his infringe-
ment suit, he will be likely to succeed in litigating the dispute in the jurisdic-
tion of his choice, for, other things being equal, a court will forebear from
deciding an issue which is already under consideration in a sister jurisdic-
tion. 2  How effective this procedure will be depends on the strictness with
which the courts construe the requirement that there be an "actual contro-
versy"0 3 prior to a suit under the act. Narrowly construed, it gives the
patentee a decided advantage, for the manufacturer can take no action until
the patentee has made a charge of infringement. 94 As a result, the right to
act first belongs to the patentee, and this first act may well be the filing of an in-
fringement suit in a friendly jurisdiction. But a broader construction of the
Declaratory Judgment Act permits the manufacturer to take the initiative if
he has reason to anticipate an infringement suit against him.95 If the action
can be as conveniently adjudicated in the forum chosen by the manufacturer
as in the one chosen by the patentee, the fact that the manufacturer institutes
suit prior to the patentee allows him to enjoin an infringement against him or
one of his customers. 9
1400(b), of limiting the number of forums in which a patent dispute may be litigated.
But inasmuch as that policy is effectively undermined through the practice of suing dis-
tributors, a broadened Declaratory Judgment Act will at least give the manufacturer a
means by which he can overcome the patentee's advantage.
92. See Note, 72 HARV. L. REv. 328, 334-35 (1958). But the Supreme Court has counsel-
ed against adherence to a "rigid mechanical solution," urging the courts instead to give "re-
gard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation."
Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1951).
93. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1958).
94. See Tremond Co. v. Schering Corp., 122 F2d 702 (3d Cir. 1941). Because notice of
infringement is sufficient basis for a declaratory judgment action, one writer cautions patent
owners not to inform infringers of the imminence of an infringement suit. Seidel, Patent
Litigation, 1 PRAc. LAw. 49, 52 (March, 1955). See generally, Note, 62 HARv. L. REv. 787
(1949) ; Note, 45 YALE L.J. 160 (1935).
95. One commentator suggests that the effectiveness of the Declaratory judgment
Act demands a realization "that harm is done and rights are jeopardized by mere dispute
or challenge without any physical attack." BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTs at xiv (2d
ed. 1941).
96. Urbain v. Knapp Bros. Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1954). But if it appears
that forum-shopping was the principal motivation for the choice of a particular venue,
the court may overlook the order in which the suits were brought. Rayco Mfg. Co. v.
Chicopee Mfg. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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